![]() ![]() Many British infantrymen were told that victory was assured and that causalities were expected to be around 10 percent. Commanders conveyed this false assumption to their soldiers that their job would be merely to mop up what little was left following five days of preparatory fires. British commanders falsely assumed little would be left following the firing of 1.5 million shells into German positions. Haig’s overestimation of the effects of fires is a challenge that plagues military commanders. Haig did not convene a meeting between his subordinate commanders to address the command relationship issues but dispatched his chief of staff to Rawlinson for laying out a procedure to turn over control of the Reserve Army’s infantry to Gough, assuming progress of the battle permitted. Haig reiterated the vague outlines for Gough to exploit any gaps of the German line with a cavalry attack to take Bapaume and then shift north toward Arras. Henry Rawlinson, had assumed control of the Fourth Army infantry divisions that Haig assigned to Gough for the attack. Gough had made it clear that the Fourth Army commander, Gen. Hubert Gough met with Haig to complain that he was in the dark regarding his relationship as Reserve Army commander with the Fourth Army and his objectives for the attack. On 27 June 1916, two days prior to British forces going over the top, Lt. Douglas Haig in conveying his intent and vision to subordinate commanders for the British Expeditionary Force attack at the Somme. The Battle of the Somme provides insightful lessons on operational warfare and leadership. Axelrod follows in describing a British army that was neither ready nor properly led when Joffre insisted the British launched the planned Somme offensive early to relieve German pressure on the French army at Verdun. Allied optimism for victory in 1916 was high. They were to be coordinated on the western front, Italian front, and Russian front with the intent to hit the enemy hard and repeatedly from all directions so that he could not build up reserves in any one front. ![]() The Allies would conduct a series of offensives in 1916 designed expressly to end the war. Alan Axelrod, renowned historian and author of Miracle at Belleau Wood, The Battle of Verdun, and How America Won World War I, tells the story of the deadliest battle of World War I in The Battle of the Somme.Īxelrod opens in describing Allied visions and plans for victory arising from a series of conferences hosted by the French at Chantilly. Failure to launch the offensive at Somme, Joffre argued, would result in the French army’s destruction. ![]() Joseph Joffre, commander in chief of French forces on the western front, requested the British army to immediately launch a planned Anglo-French offensive on the Somme to relieve pressure on the French army at Verdun. Initial success of the German advance coupled with significant French losses threatened the existence of the French army. The 1916 German offensive to seize Verdun interrupted Allied plans for a series of massive simultaneous offensive operations in all theaters to knock the Germans off balance. Lyons Press, Guilford, Connecticut, 2016, 291 pagesīook Review published on: January 4, 2019 The Battle of the Somme The Story of the Deadliest Battle in WWI Alan Axelrod ![]()
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